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THE
Management
OF THE
WAR.
IN A
Second Letter
TO
A Tory-Member.

Non Cauponantis bellum, sed Belligerantis.

L O N D O N :

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30 Nov. 1710

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THE CHURCH OF THE HOLY TRINITY

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* * * Novemb. 30. 1710.

S I R,

YOU have here, according to the Promise I made you in my last, the Thoughts of your Humble Servant, with the same Freedom and Impartiality, upon the other two Points, relating to the Management of the War, which the Pamphlets have been so full of; I mean, the Fault of making *Flanders* the chief Seat of the War, and the Methods the D. of *M.* has us'd to prolong it for his Private Interest.

First, 'Tis pretended, that pushing the War in *Flanders*, is pushing it in a wrong Place, *France* being cover'd on that Side with so strong a Frontier. But this Accusation will appear to have no more Sense in it, than I have shewn you in my former Letter there is in Complaining as they do, of our not pushing it in *Spain*. To clear this Matter, they should shew, not how improper, or inconvenient a Country *Flanders* is to make the War in; but where it could have been made better, or with more Success: For if they don't prove this, they prove nothing. If it be the best Side we could have turn'd

the main Force of our Arms to, tho' it be not so good as we could have wish'd, there is no pretence for finding any Fault upon this Head: And they that do so, can mean nothing else, but to condemn indirectly the War it self; which, had it depended upon them, they do in effect say, should never have been begun. But to come nearer the Point, and to judge whether it be wrong to make *Flanders* the chief Seat of the War, we must compare it with what other Places it could be push'd in; and a short Comparison will decide this Matter, to any Man of tolerable Understanding, if he have with it what I confess is not common, Tolerable Honesty: For Integrity and Honesty of Mind can't preserve themselves, where the violent Prejudices of Party and Faction have once got Possession. Now all the other Places the War could have been pushed in, are *Spain*, *Italy*, and the *Rhine*. The first of these I have already shewn, till I have tir'd you, is Impracticable: And I think Experience has abundantly convinc'd us, how little is to be hop'd for from the other two. Besides, an Experiment of the Second has been made; and when the War had been remov'd with incredible Success and Speed, from the *Danube* to the *Rhine*, and from thence to the *Moselle*, the next Year a great Army was carry'd thither, to penetrate *France*, on that which is confess'dly the weakest side. But how did this end? Much indeed to the Honour of the General, who by that Glorious March outdid himself; but thro' the Disappointments he met with, not at all to the Advantage

vantage of the Common Cause : He was forc'd to return to *Flanders*, where the *French* had made his Presence absolutely necessary. If this had not been try'd, these Gentlemen might have complain'd, tho' for some Reasons, I scarce think they would ; but to complain now, when the Experiment has been made, is imposing too grossly upon us.

Well then, what is next ? Would they have had the D. of *M.* have march'd with a great Army to *Savoy*, as a proper Place to be the main Seat of the War ? I shall shew you by and by, it was not the D. of *M.*'s Fault he did not go to *Italy*, when our Affairs there were most desperate ; but should he, when there was no such necessity for it, have carry'd Forty or Fifty thousand Men thither, what Treatment must he have expected from those Men, who made his March to *Bavaria* so great a Crime ; as we all remember this Party did, in the Interval between the Actions of *Schellenberg* and *Blenheim*. And even that great unparallel'd Success and all the glorious Conquests of that Year, could not divert the Malice that some swell'd with, or hinder the Rage from breaking out, which they hop'd to vent with so much Pleasure and Revenge. I mention this only, to shew the Sense of the Party, and what might have been expected from them, who were so angry at that Glorious March, if the D. of *M.* had carry'd his Army to *Italy* or *Savoy*, when *Turin* was reliev'd, and no pressing Necessities call'd for it.

But the mention of that Interval puts me in mind of another thing, which the same Pamphlets

Pamphlets make so much Noise about, that, I hope, you will pardon the Digression, while I take a little notice of it; and that is, the famous *Act of Security*: Which was the other favourite Topick, with which the Faction pleas'd themselves; tho' the prodigious Successes of that Year might easily have convinc'd them, such Clamours would be as unpopular, as they were unjust. For that they were unjust, any impartial Man will be satisfy'd, that does but examine the Fact, how that Bill came to be pass'd. You remember, I am sure, what a very melancholy Prospect we had here in *England*, of Affairs in that Interval. At that time the *Scotch* Parliament was Sitting, were very uneasy, would give no Money, nor dispatch any Publick Business, till that Act was granted them. What Part shall the Q. take in this Matter? 'Tis the unanimous Opinion of Her *Scotch* Ministers, that it must be comply'd with; they can't answer for the Quiet of the Kingdom an Hour, if it be refus'd: Shall an *English* Minister take upon him singly to advise the contrary, in a *Scotch* Affair, and against their Opinions, who may be presum'd to be the best Judges of the Disposition and Temper of their own People? Let us suppose he had done so, and that the Refusal had produc'd any Tumults or Insurrections in that Kingdom, where every Body knew there had for a long time been a great deal of ill Blood. Without entering further into this Matter, I would only ask this Question; What would these Gentlemen have said in this Case? Would it not have been loudly affirm'd to have

have been a concerted thing to ruin us; and that our Army was sent out of the way on purpose, that we might be the more effectually Undone, and out of the reach of any Succour or Relief? Could the Success of *Blenheim* be foreseen? Could any Body be sure the Refusal of the Bill would have ended in nothing worse, than the losing the Supply? Which does not use to be thought a trifling Matter. Was it not of the utmost Consequence, in that untoward Posture of Affairs, that Peace should be preserv'd among our selves? To be angry therefore with a Minister, for advising, or not opposing the Royal Assent to this Bill in such Circumstances, is both unjust and absurd. And I think, one may be pretty sure, what, as I have put the Case, the Faction would have said, had the Bill been refus'd, who now say the passing of it was so great a Fault, and make heavy Complaints about it; tho' the same Minister has taken the Advantage of better times, to undo what bad ones had forc'd him to comply with: And has to the Surprise and Confusion of his Enemies, extinguish'd the unhappy Differences that threaten'd the Constitution and Succession, by a perpetual Union; which he will always be allow'd to have been the chief Adviser and Promoter of. And if the Truth were known, 'tis this, which is at bottom the Impardonable Crime. Such is the hard Fate of *British* Ministers, whom no Wisdom or Abilities, no Justice or Integrity, no Fidelity and Zeal for their Prince and Country, nor the most happy and successful Administration, can protect

rest from the Virulence of Faction ; which has made me often think them the only Slaves in this very free Nation. This has been the Fate of the Old M—rs. and sure the New ones can't hope for better Luck.

But to return from this Digression. You see upon a very short View, that to lay a Stress of the War in *Spain*, *Savoy* or the *Rhine*, is altogether impracticable. From whence it follows, that it must be laid in *Flanders* or nowhere ; which last I am afraid is what these Complainers would bring about.

But to set this Matter in another Light ; if *Flanders* be so improper a place to push the War in, how come all the Allies so readily to give into it ? How came no Remonstrances to have been made by any of them against it ? How came the *Dutch*, who have been always thought to be in haste enough for Peace, to go into that Scheme, by which they are so unlikely to obtain it ? How come the Princes whose Troops are in our Service, to send them into the Field so early, and let them continue there so long as they do, if the Scene of the War is so wrong laid, and we are so little the nearer coming to an end of it ; tho' the Service be so hard, and their Troops suffer so much in it ? How comes the Emperor, when the Empire is so naked and defenseless, and is so terribly threatned to be invaded by the *French*, and one Year felt their Threats in earnest ; how comes he to send such a Body of Troops to *Flanders*, if they could be employ'd better any where else ; especially when he has so good a General of his own to put at the Head of them ; a General who
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has the happiness to be in favour with the Faction, for no other Reason, but because he is not their own; for if he were, what Quarter could he expect for advising to send Troops to run their Heads against Walls in *Flanders*, which they would say, he advis'd merely for his own Honour, and for the Pleasure of being at the Head of a Hundred Thousand Men. Thus the Faction would use him if he were *English*; for thus they use the D. for no other Reason in the World; and thus the *French* Scribblers, who are in the same Interest, use them both. I would recommend to you upon this Head a Monthly *French* Paper, call'd, *The Clef de Cabinet*; which would be a better Key to the understanding the Designs and Language of the Faction, than all the things they write themselves; and of more use than any thing that is writ against them; for which Reason, I have many times wish'd it translated into our own Language, for the Benefit of the *English* Reader, who will be judging of the Affairs and Politicks of all Countries, when he can speak no Language but his own, and that obliges him blindly to follow those blind Guides, the Pamphleteers, who are but the mercenary Tools of the Party, they serve, and seldom know any thing of Affairs abroad themselves; much less are they fit Masters to teach others, how to judge about them. And I could be glad to know, how such Guides and their Followers come to be more competent Judges in what manner the War shou'd be pursu'd; than our Allies are, who have so great an Interest in it; who by their Situation

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on have so much the Advantage of us in knowing what is done; who by their nearness see and feel what we only talk of at a distance; and in short, under whose Eyes every thing passes: And yet notwithstanding the separate Interests they have, they all agree to shew us, that in their Opinion the War could no where else be push'd to so much Advantage for the Common Cause, as it has been in *Flanders*: Where if we were to be on the Defensive only, and do nothing but march from one strong Camp to another, to wear out a Campaign of four Months, which by the help of good Management, may in a little time be the Case; even then a great Army would be absolutely necessary to cover so large and weak a Frontier, as that of the *Netherlands* was three Years ago, when it had not one single Town of any considerable Strength to secure any part of it. And is it not a great pity, a noble Army should not be suffer'd to continue in Tranquility and Quiet, that is, useless and unactive? Ought a General to be forgiven, who has taken so much pains to make them useful, by the Addition of a little more Strength, which could not have been employ'd, we are sure, to any Purpose any where else. This single Reflection may convince a Man how ridiculous all their Clamour is, against making *Flanders* the chief Seat of the War, where upon any Scheme the greatest Army must have been, tho' little enough to do nothing, had not that Addition been made to it, which these Gentlemen are so much offended at. There is nothing wanting to make

make this single Argument a Demonstration, but to shew you, that this Addition to the *Flanders* Army could have been of no Service any where else. If they had not been employ'd here, they would either not have been us'd at all, or upon the *Rhine*. Now there was no want of them to be on the defensive; that is plain from the Event; and act offensively they could not, for one plain Reason, which is, that the *Imperial* Army have no one thing that is necessary for an offensive War; they have neither Money, nor Magazines, nor Ammunition, nor Artillery, nor Bread-Wagons; and even where all these things may be had, to how little purpose is it, if they that are to use them, can't take the Field betimes, which is what is never to be hop'd for on the *Rhine*? 'Tis therefore plain these Troops must have been perfectly useless, had they not been brought to *Flanders*, where without them no more could have been done, than there has been in other Parts; and this we may be sure was the true Reason of the Emperor's sending such a Number of his Troops thither, as he did; he took them from a Place where he knew they could be of no use, to send them where they might act vigorously in Conjunction with an Army which is perfectly well provided with all Necessaries, and under the Conduct of a General, whose Services the H. of *Austria* will always retain a grateful Sense of, for having in so wonderful a manner sav'd the Empire.

After having seen the Judgment of the Allies in this Point, it may not be amiss to turn to another View of it; and see the Sentiments of our Enemies upon the Question; who we shall find have confirm'd the Opinion of our Friends. There is nothing they have shewn themselves so much afraid of, as of our Progress in *Flanders*; nothing they have so much labour'd to divert us from. What else is the meaning of the mighty Threats they have fill'd us with every Winter since the *Ramellies* Campaign, that they would invade the Empire with a powerful Army in the Spring, and drive *K. Charles* out of *Catalonia*? Which two things they never threatned more than last Year; and the latter, we were, I believe, all in pain for, upon their making so much noise of entering *Catalonia* with two Armies at the same time? I ask what they did this for? Cou'd it be for any other End, but to make us lessen our Strength in *Flanders*, and perswade us to detach to the *Rhine*, and send Troops to *Spain*? If this were not their meaning, why did they not execute their Threats, when they were sure to meet with so little opposition? Why have the Allies drawn the greatest Force of the Enemy to *Flanders*, rather than they the Strength of the Allies to *Germany*? Can it be for any other Reason, but because the Enemy knew, they could not give so deep a Wound in one Place as they might receive in the other? 'Tis this made them withdraw their Troops from *Spain*, and make so many Detachments from the *Rhine*, and fetch the Duke of *Berwick* from *Savoy*. All other
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Points have been given up to guard this one. They have neglected all the other Parts of the War, where they might have acted with Success; not to make a vigorous Effort in *Flanders* themselves, where for several Years they have not so much as pretended to do any thing, or to give the Allies a Blow, but to fence against those they apprehended from them. And is not this a plain Confession, they think no Ravage they can make in the Empire, no Attempt they can make in *Spain*, of so much Consequence to them, as to stop the Progress the Allies are making in *Flanders*? Don't they by this own, that this is the Home-Push, they are most concern'd to guard against? Is not the last Campaign a surprizing Instance of this, in which they have shewn they thought 140000 Men well employ'd in doing nothing else, but hindring the Allies from doing so much as they would? tho' what they did, notwithstanding all the Opposition so vast an Army could make, was more than the great Monarch ever did any one Year of the last War, or we, I fear, are like to do again. Go now, and believe if you can, these Men that tell you the Scene of the War is ill laid, and that *Flanders* is not the properest Part to attack *France* in; after you have seen the Judgments both of Allies and of Enemies upon it.

Thus far I have been shewing you, that as bad a Place as *Flanders* is to push a War in, 'tis the best, or rather only one, in which it could be push'd, with any tolerable Prospect of Success. But I shall now set this Matter in another Light, and distinguish upon what

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I have hitherto allow'd. *Flanders* was indeed, a very bad Part to attack *France* in, it being cover'd with a Frontier, that was thought Impenetrable ; but that Frontier has now great part of it been taken, and is turn'd against those it has hitherto defended : And by this means *France* lies now as open and expos'd on the *Flanders* Side, as on any other ; and indeed more. So that nothing can be wish'd more feasible, than what remains to enable the Allies to penetrate into the Heart of it. Not above a Fifth Part of the Work is now left, of what the Allies had upon their Hands Three Years ago. *Flanders*, I say, was at the beginning of the War, a very bad Part to attack *France* in, 'twas cover'd with so strong a Frontier. I will readily allow these Gentlemen this ; but then I must tell them, That it was for this Reason the D. of *M.* look'd out for another Scene of Action, and did all that could be done on his Part towards it ; and therefore when he had in the Two first Campaigns driven the *French* from *Nimeguen* to *Namur*, and had set the *Dutch* at Ease by the Reduction of *Gelder* and *Limburg*, and clear'd the *Rhine* by taking *Bonne*, he did not the third Year content himself with walking up and down in the Neighbourhood of *Holland*, where there was no Prospect of doing any thing to Purpose ; but march'd into the Heart of *Germany*, forc'd the strong Pass of *Schellenberg*, before the end of *June* ; which is the Key of *Barvaria* : And had the Ammunition and Artillery been ready, as the Duke had been assur'd it was, he had march'd directly to *Munich*, and without

out the hazard of another Battel, had in a Fortnight's time not only extinguish'd that fatal War, that threaten'd nothing less than the Ruin of the whole Empire, but had gain'd the Elector also over to the Side of the Allies, who, could he have been perswaded to make their Interest his own, might have done the greatest Service to the Common Cause, both in *Germany* and in *Flanders*. But when that Point was lost, and the Inability of the *Germans* to make a Siege, had encourag'd the Elector to break off the Treaty he had entred into, and the Sword had decided the Fate of his Country, what Part did the D. of *M.* take next? Not that of returning to *Flanders*; no, he improv'd the rest of that wonderful Campaign, to facilitate the Operations of the next, in a Part where *France* might be more easily attack'd: He pass'd the *Rhine* before the end of *August*, and made, or rather submitted to the making the Siege of *Landau*, by Pr. *Lewis*, while he cover'd it: And that the unexpected length of the Siege might not break his Design, without waiting for the End of it, he advanc'd with a Body of Troops to the *Saar*, surpriz'd *Treves*, and possess'd himself of other proper Posts for erecting Magazines, and opening the next Campaign with the Siege of *Saar-Lewis*; and had that Project succeeded, that Campaign had probably been the last. Why it did not, I need not tell you: You can't but remember, that the D. of *M.*'s Part was punctually perform'd; His Army arriv'd at *Treves* at the time appointed,
and

and from thence he made a bold March to *Syrk*, in the sight of Monsieur *Villars*, who thought fit to retire to a safe Post, where he could not be attack'd, and left the Country open to the Confederates, quite to *Saar-Lewis*; of which they might have made the Siege, without any Opposition. But all was defeated by the Failure of Pr. *Lewis*; tho' more Pains had been taken to fix him to what had been agreed, than any one, that does not know the thing, can believe; and the Duke was oblig'd to hasten back to *Flanders*, where the *French* begun to Act: Which he did with that Success, that he oblig'd them to raise the Siege of *Leige*, retook *Huy*, forc'd the Lines, defeated great part of their Army; and had every Body been as forward as his Grace on that Occasion, he had anticipated no little Part of the Glory of the next Campaign. All that was done this Year in *Flanders*, gave the Duke no great hopes of doing much there the next. The Duke of *Savoy* in the mean time, was reduc'd to the last Extremity. This made him not only persuade the Allies to send two considerable Reinforcements to him, but form the Design of marching thither himself to his Relief. And nothing hindred his going, but that the *Dutch* thought they shou'd be too much expos'd by his Absence; who would not consent to the sending the 10000 *Hessians* to *Savoy*, but on Condition he would stay with the Army in *Flanders*; and God was pleas'd to bless his Zeal for the Common Cause, by a most surprising Victory, when he had not the least Hopes of it. For who could have expected the

the *French* would quit the *Dyle*, they had been for Nine or Ten Months fortifying, to give the Allies the Opportunity they so much wanted of a fair Engagement; which ended in the Reduction of the greatest part of the *Netherlands*, which, as much as forgetting is in Fashion, I doubt not, but honest Men will remember.

Thus you see for Five Campaigns of this War the D. of *M—* either did not act in *Flanders*, or did it out of necessity, and much against his Will. So sensible was he how difficult it must be to bring the War to a speedy End, when the chief Weight of it lay in a Country against which *France* was so well defended. The Sense he had of this, made him very unwilling to end so great a Campaign as that of *Ramellies*, without the Reduction of *Mons*, which he would fain have made the Siege of, to frighten the *French* into a Peace, or secure the making a good War the next Year; which he foresaw he could not be sure of without that Conquest, since it would be in the Power of the Enemy to avoid a Battel if they pleas'd, and the Confederate Army would not be big enough to make any great Siege and cover *Brabant* at the same time. This Apprehension made the D—ke, of *M—* earnest for the Seige, but the badness of the Weather at the end of the Siege of *Aeth* made the *Dutch* afraid of entring upon so great an Enterprize so late in the Year. They who know any thing of the War, know this to be true, and those from whom these Clamours come, know a great deal more; they know his

Grace went to the *Hague* himself soon after the Battle of *Ramellies* to concert with the States how that Victory might be improv'd to the best Advantage, and to hasten the Preparations for it. They, I believe, could tell us, that if what his Grace propos'd and press'd for, had been comply'd with, that Campaign had been still greater than it was, and had enabled us to push the War in *Flanders*, with the like Vigor the next Year; which for the Reasons I have already hinted, was spent without much Action; the *French* declining to fight, and the Allies on their part having no Inclination to it, nor Force enough to make a Siege without great difficulty: Not that the Duke of *M---* himself was for sitting still; but the States were so frightened with the Battle of *Almanza*, and the Invasion of *Germany*, that they would not let him stir. Thus the Duke could neither carry the War out of *Flanders*, nor act with Vigour in it; such was the Fate of this Campaign, and the same it must have been of all succeeding Ones, had not the Duke laid hold of the Opportunity, which the change of Affairs in *Italy* gave him to increase his Army, by that Addition of Troops, which the Emperor was prevail'd with to send to him; otherwise there was nothing to be hop'd for but from Battles, which 'tis very easy for the Enemy to avoid in *Flanders*; and when they can be attack'd, 'tis with more hazard than the States care to run so near home, especially considering, that the little Work our Allies give the *French* upon the *Rhine*, and in *Savoy*, leave them at liberty to

to bring what Numbers they please against the *Flanders* Army. There was no possible Way of overcoming this Difficulty, but that which the Duke took to procure a Body of Troops to join him from the *Rhine*; where I have already shewn you, they would have been of no use at all.

'Tis to this we owe all the Successes we have had in *Flanders* for these three last Campaigns, in which, thro' the indefatigable Care and Diligence of my Lord M-- and the perfect good Agreement between him and Prince *Eugene*, things have been done, that Posterity will wonder at; the Frontier that was thought impenetrable, is not only broken into, but thorough; the Work of half an Age has been undone, Places have been taken, upon which an infinite Treasure has been spent; and the Enemy have been reduc'd so low, after all the Advantages with which they began this War, that had our Engineers been at all equal to our Generals, the Allies had been now upon the *Soam*; which wou'd have left the *French* no room to doubt, whether they should give them the Peace they demanded, or not. But we see but half the Advantage the Allies had in acting offensively in *Flanders*, if we consider only the Successes of our Arms on that Side. The Vigour with which they acted here, was at the same time, the saving all the weak Parts of the Alliance from the dangers they would otherwise have been expos'd to. Had the Allies been upon the Defensive only in *Flanders*, the *French* would not have been content to be so in the other Seats of the

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War. We may remember they began the *Ramellies* Campaign offensively in all Parts at the same time; and they would have been at liberty ever since to do the same in other Places, had not the Vigour with which the War was push'd in *Flanders*, and the near danger with which that threatned them, made them weaken themselves every where else to guard this single Point, and yet to very little purpose: as you will easily be convinc'd, if you run over in your Thoughts the many and great Sieges we have made in the sight of the Enemy, and in defiance of such vast Numbers, who think it work enough to make Entrenchments to cover themselves, while we are taking their Towns; and every step we advance, is so sensible to them, that they dare not give the least room for it, by attempting either to raise a Siege, or make a Diversion; so weak and tender is *France* become on this Side, where a few Years ago it was so strong, that all Attempts against it seem'd to be in vain. I believe, I may now take for granted, you have heard enough upon this Head; the State of which stands thus. *Flanders* was indeed at first a very bad Place to push the War in, but there was a necessity for it; 'twas the only Place where there was a possibility of doing any thing; and as bad a Place as it was, 'tis now by the successful Conduct of this War become a very good one; the Success on this Side has sav'd all the weak Parts of the Alliance; it drew the Troops of *France* out of *Spain*, from whence no Forces sent thither, could e'er have driven them; it has oblig'd them to be on the

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Defensive in *Savoy*, or rather to leave *Dauphiné* and *Provence* without Defence, if our Friends on that Side wou'd do what we expect from them; it has preserv'd that great but languid Body, the Empire, from the dreadful Ravages it has been yearly threatened with; it has reduc'd their Armies to subsist upon their own Country, a thing new to *France*, and has turn'd all their Thoughts of invading others to defend themselves; it has driven them from Post to Post, and in spite of all the Opposition, the united Force of *France* cou'd make, has taken whole Provinces from them; nothing but *Arras* is wanting to the Allies to oblige them to retire within their inmost Circle, beyond which all would be open to us: In short, it has driven them to the extremity of Danger, and had not some new Appearances made them hope the Face of the War would now at last change; 'tis pretty certain, the Invincible *Louis* would not have hazarded the Safety of his own Kingdom, by further Efforts to support the Usurpation of his Grandson.

This Point is the *Flanders* War brought to by the surprizing Conduct of the Man, whom the Faction is so angry with; and one is tempted to suspect this is his great Crime; what else can mean so much Clamour, against pushing the War on that Side, when we are upon the point of entring *France*, which true *Britains* have so long wish'd for, and that from Men, who made no noise at all, but on the contrary, highly approv'd as may be shewn under their own Hands, the Management of the War, and the Conduct
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of the General, when there were little hopes of his making his Way thro' so many difficulties, which have since so happily been overcome.

But whatever be the true reason that has brought the Duke of *M---* under the displeasure of these Gentlemen, the pretended one is chiefly this, that he has unnecessarily prolong'd the War for his private Interest, a Calumny, which you will, I dare say, conclude to be very groundless from what I have already said. But because this is the Capital Accusation, and 'tis natural for People when they grow weary of a War, to give into any surmizes of this kind, be they never so ill grounded ; I shall shew you the vile Ingratitude and Impudence of these Men, in such a Manner, as will, I hope, abundantly convince you, the most implacable Malice could have invented nothing more stupidly ridiculous, than to accuse him of prolonging the War, who has more Reason than any Body to wish a good End to it, and has done more towards it, than his best Friends cou'd ever hope for.

Now if there were any Truth in this Accusation, and the D. of *M.* had unnecessarily prolong'd the War, it must be either in the Quality of General, or as he is Her Majesty's Plenipotentiary. To judge therefore rightly of this Matter, we must see how he has behav'd himself in each of these Capacities : And First, as he is General. If he has offended in this Quality, he has the Happiness to offend with good Company ; with Prince *Eugene*, and with the Deputies of the States,

States, whose Consent is necessary in all the Operations of the War. If therefore there be any Blame in the Management of that, it must not all lie upon the D. of M. unless it appear that he has hinder'd the good Measures they would have taken, or forc'd upon them his own ill ones. But neither of these, I think, are so much as pretended; nor, I suppose, will be. I can't hear there have ever been any Differences between the Duke and the Prince, not so much as in their Opinions about any one Enterprize: No Body has observ'd any Coldness or Reservedness between them, or any other the least Sign of Misunderstanding. But on the contrary, 'tis Notorious to all the World, that they act with the most perfect Harmony, and with the greatest mutual Esteem of each other; without any Marks of Jealousy, without the least Suspicion of Envy, or of having any separate Ends or Aims, to eclipse the Glory of one another, or advance their own. The Friendship is so great, the Agreement between them is so entire, the Intimacy and Secrecy they concert with, is so wonderful; that the Armies under them, enjoy all the Advantages they can have, from the Command of two great Generals; without any of the Inconveniences that one would think those Advantages must unavoidably be attended with. They are to all Purposes but one Army, and under one General; there is no Sign of more than one, the Unity between the Two is so perfect. If then there be any Fault in the Conduct of the War, for these Three last Years, the Prince must come
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in for his Share ; they must both be Absolv'd, or both Condemn'd ; or else these Gentlemen have some strange Rules of Judging by, which I am yet to learn. But let us see whether it will mend their Cause, to consider the Part the Deputies of the States have in these Matters : If they agreed with the Duke in the Measures that have been taken, can he be in Fault, and not they ? Or have we heard they have ever differ'd from him, in opposing any thing that wou'd tend to prolong the War ? Have they desir'd the Army might take the Field sooner than he would have them, or continue in it longer ? Have they press'd any brave and bold Undertaking, that he has declin'd ; has he been against Fighting, when they were for it ? Have they been for making Sieges of Towns, that were more advanc'd within the Enemies Frontier, and leaving those that have been Besieg'd, behind them, to fall of themselves ? Or have they been for penetrating into *France*, without making any Sieges at all ? If any thing of this Kind could be made appear, that would be a Discovery indeed. But depend upon it, they have never propos'd any one thing that would push on the War, which he has been against : But on the contrary, his Hands have been often ty'd, when he was impatient to be doing something brave and Enterprising. But I had rather leave his Grace without Defence, than pretend to do him Justice, by entering into things he thinks fit to make a Secret of ; the End of the War will be time enough for that. In the mean while one may be sure, by all one has
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ever heard of Deputies, that they are something like *Socrates's* Genius, which never put him upon doing any thing; it's whole Business was to check him, when he seem'd to be too forward. If therefore one would do the Duke Justice, the Vigor that has been us'd in pushing the War, should be imputed to him; and that there has not been more done, to the Restraints he has been always under; always, but one Campaign, that of *Blenheim*, in which he has shewn what he would do, were he left to himself. Had he a mind for a lingering War, nothing was so easy; he needed only not to have fought that Battel, and the War might have lasted *there* long enough, which that Day ended at a Blow.

In one Sense, indeed, I am willing to allow He has prolong'd the War, that without him must have ended long ago in an ill Peace; which he has hinder'd our coming to, so soon as some seem to wish we had: And this may some time or other be made his Crime. In truth, his Conduct the whole War, has been one constant Endeavour to hinder its ending ill so soon as it might, and must have done otherwise. This made him so earnest to Fight the *French*, as we all know he was, the first Campaign, when he thought he had them at a great Advantage: This made him take so much Pains to bring them to an Engagement the Second Campaign, when he stole a March, and pass'd a River, and got between their Army and their Lines: This made him march to *Bavaria* the Third, and to the *Moselle* the Fourth: This made

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him endeavour to go to *Italy* the Fifth, to prevent the Ruin of the D. of *Savoy*, and the Loss of All on that Side : This made him the Sixth so importunate with the States, for near two Months together, to march from the Camp of *Meldert*, and after that to try to fall upon the *French* Army at *Senef* : This made him the Seventh pass the *Schelde*, and Fight the Battel of *Oudenarde*; without which all *Flanders* must have been lost; and afterwards make the Siege of *Lille*, which was the most sensible Part *France* could be wounded in ; and begin in *December* the Siege of *Gand*, which had it been left in *French* Hands, the Allies, instead of doing any thing themselves the next Campaign, must have seen *Lille* and *Menin* taken from them, without a Possibility of Relieving them. This made him the next Year, when he could not Fight the *French*, Surprise them with the Siege of *Tournay*; when they expected nothing less, and take so much Care that the rest of the Campaign might not be lost. With this View he endeavour'd to Surprise *St. Guilain*; and that failing, by the time the Garison of *Tournay* march'd out, he had pass'd the Lines of *Mons*; After which he fought the great Battel of *Taniers*; in which the Enemy were so defeated, that they who had hazarded a Battel to prevent the Siege of *Mons*, did not dare to venture any thing for the Relief of it; towards which they did not make the least Step, tho' the Allies had neither River, nor In-trenchment to cover them. Lastly, 'twas this made him begin the last Campaign Six Weeks sooner than the Enemy were able to take the Field ;

Field; which gave him Possession of their Lines, and soon after of *Douay*; and had that Siege been ended in the time propos'd, *Arras* had met with the same Fate; which, however, was in great Measure compensated by the Reduction of *Bethune*, *St. Venant*, and *Aire*: Which last Place, though some may think it a slight Conquest, the *French*, who knew best the Importance of their own Places, thought it so great an Enterprize that they could not believe the Allies would venture on it; and when 'twas taken, they own'd it open'd to them a Passage to the *Soam*; and without much Skill in Military Matters, a Man can't look upon a Map, and not see that besides the Command of all the *Lys*, which is a vast Advantage for erecting Magazines against another Year, it gives the Allies a great Front, which will make it much more difficult for the *French* to stop their Progress on that side, when they are not confin'd to one Way only of advancing to their remaining Frontier, as they would have been, had the Campaign ended without *Aire*.

These have been the Endeavours and Steps the D. of *M.* has made this War, which have all contributed to prolong it in one Sense, as they have kept the Allies in Heart, and set them above the mean Conditions of an ill Peace; which they must have long since submitted to, had either the Emperor or the Duke of *Savoy* been ruin'd, or had the Enemy gain'd any considerable Advantage in *Flanders*; or if our Inaction there had left the Enemy at Liberty to act Offensively in other Parts. All which has been prevented

by the Conduct of the Duke of *M.* as you can't but see in what I have already said ; except that which respects the Duke of *Savoy* ; in the saving him you may be apt to think, the D. of *M.* could have no Part. But not to tell you, he made all the Use he could of the Queen's Interest to support Pr. *Eugene* at the Imperial Court, where at that time he had his Enemies, nor to mention the Supplies he procur'd him from *England* ; if you look back five or six Years, you will find the Duke made in the depth of Winter a Journey to *Berlin*, which obtain'd from the King of *Prussia* a Succour of 8000 Men for *Italy*, which had been often and absolutely refus'd to the Imperial Court ; and the Applications of the Ministers of *England* and *Holland* had been made to as little Purpose. These were the Troops that, as we all know, enabled Prince *Eugene* to make a Stand ; and two Years after, the same Zeal for the common Cause procur'd for *Italy* Two more Reinforcements, a lesser of *Palatine*, and another of 10000 *Hessians* ; which last is in so particular a manner owing to the Duke, that after they had not only been agreed for, but had actually began their March, they had been diverted from this Service, and employ'd on the *Rhine*, had not he persisted for their being sent to *Italy*, where some were inclin'd to think, they would not be wanted, upon the Turn that the Battel of *Ramelies* would probably give to Affairs. But the Event shew'd how right the Duke judg'd : Nothing could have sav'd *Turin* but a Battel, and without those Troops a Battel had been impossible, which was difficult

cult enough with them. And now I believe you will allow, I have Reason to put the Methods that were taken to prevent the Ruin of the D. of *Savoy*, among the Ways the D. of *M.* has taken to prevent an ill Peace: To which I ought to add another, which was as strange an Action in him, as any of the rest; and that was his Journey to *Saxony*, to persuade the K. of *Sweden* not to disturb the Allies by the Jealousy his Stay in *Saxony* gave the Emperor. What a very ill Influence his Stay there had on the Common Cause, we all know: How far that Journey contributed to remove it, I am not enough in the Secret to know; but 'tis certain, he did from that time give no fresh Jealousies by making any new Demands, but on the contrary receded from several Points, and set himself in earnest to making the necessary Dispositions for quitting *Saxony*; which he did at the end of the Summer, as soon as ever the Treaty between him and the Emperor was sign'd; which put an end to the Fears the Allies had been so long under, and enabled both K. *Augustus* and the Emperor to send Troops to the Support of the Common Cause, instead of drawing any from it; which had the King of *Sweden* not remov'd, they must have done. Now what Part the D. of *M.* had in this, I can't pretend to affirm; but I believe I may venture to say, that had some others done what he did, they would have made no difficulty to give these Men all the Merit, who are so unwilling to allow any thing to the D. of *M.*

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Now if this be prolonging the War, the D. of M. is certainly guilty in a very high Degree: For all this he has done, we are sure, and more; besides a great deal of Management and Negotiation, which is yet a Secret to us: But thus much is open and above-board. And if his Accusers don't mean an ill Peace, and prolonging the War to hinder it; I can't imagine what they would pretend. I always thought to take all Opportunities of acting Offensively in an Offensive War, had been the Right Management, and the most natural way to put a good End to it. I never could have suspected, that Great Armies, Long Campaigns, Surprising Marches, Glorious Battels, and Important Sieges, had been the way to prolong the War, if these Gentlemen had not told us so. By what they find fault with, you may see what it is they like, and which way they would have a General take to end a War. They would, it seems, have him manage his Troops tenderly and frugally, take Care how he takes the Field too soon, for fear of ill Accidents; instead of drawing them out in *April*, keep them in their Quarters till *June*; and because the latter Season is usually wet, let them leave the Field before the *September* Rains overtake them: To keep Men in the Field till *November* or *December*, is the Ruin of an Army. They would have him make no Sieges of Towns that are well fortify'd; for that is making Men run their Heads against Walls: Fight no Battels, but when you are sure of Victory; That is, never fight at all,

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much less fatigue the poor Men with great and continual Marches to look out for the Enemy, to force their Camp, to attack an Entrenchment, or pass a River in their Sight; These are hazardous Things, and can't be done but at great Disadvantage: Such Attempts have often miscarry'd, except this War; and when they succeed, Armies often suffer very much: Tho' it must be confes'd indeed, the D. of M. has been very fortunate, in passing so many Rivers and Lines with so little Loss. But Things are not the more Reasonable, because a Man has Luck; and therefore he is justly to be blam'd for them; for he could not be sure he should succeed. In short, a General should always favour his Men, never make unmerciful Night-Marches; tho' the Duke indeed has practic'd them with strange good Fortune, upon a great many Occasions. Never march above Three Leagues at a time, that the Enemy knowing your Rule, may never be surpriz'd; for by your long Marches, your own Army and the Enemy's too suffer extremely, especially in warm Weather, when Men and Officers are, for want of their Baggage, forc'd to be without the necessary Refreshments. Lastly, Avoid of all Things Marching in wet Weather; which tires the Men strangely: And for that Reason, when you are in a good Camp, never leave it without Consulting the Glass: Wait till it be *settled Fair*, and then a moderate March can do the Men no hurt, but rather Good. These, by the Rule of Contraries, seem to be the Methods by which
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these Gentlemen think the War ought to have been managed. These are the Old Military Maxims which are evidently good for an Army ; and 'tis impossible, in their Opinion, a General can recede from them so much as the D. of *M.* has done, but for his private Interest, and with a Design to prolong the War. And it must be confess'd, if the Generals of both Sides were agreed to follow these Maxims, an Army would have a good Time of it, be a fine Army, brave complete Veteran Troops : The Men and Officers would understand their Business; and we should not have our Regiments fill'd with so many raw unexperienc'd Creatures as are now in them : Besides, so few Recruits would be wanted, that they might be all pick'd Men, and rais'd without any Grievance to the Country. I fancy, if the Government were of the Mind of these Gentlemen, and thought this the likeliest way to put a good End to the War, there might be Generals enow found, who would be very careful and exact to execute them ; which, 'tis certain, the Duke of *M.* never has been, nor ever will be. And therefore, if that be a Crime, 'tis high time he should be remov'd : But if this be the sure way to prolong the War, without a possibility of ever coming at a good Peace ; as I and all others, who are not in the Secret of the Faction, must needs think it is, then the way the Duke of *M.* has taken, must be the true Way to end the War by such a Peace, as will best answer our Design in going into it ; and consequently their Insinuations against the Conduct of the Duke of *M.* as if
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he had a mind to prolong the War, are ridiculous and scandalously false; and honest Men must always think them so, till they show that more might have been done, or that the Reason it was not done, proceeded from his own Fault, and not from the want of any necessary consent in others: Or that he perswaded those who act in Conjunction with him, to go against their own Judgments into any wrong things of his own proposing. But I must beg these Gentlemen to distinguish between judging of things before they are done, and making Judgments of them afterwards. There is nothing so easy as to be wise when 'tis too late; but the true Wisdom is to know, which is the most reasonable Part to take, while the Event is future and in the dark, and the Mind must determine it self, according to what *then* seems most probable; when no Certainty can be had, and Probabilities only are within its reach; and therefore if they can say any thing to the purpose, they must show, that the Duke of *M.* and Prince *E.* and the Deputies of the States, and such other Persons, as they think fit to consult with, as well qualify'd as they are suppos'd to be to judge of Military Operations, have not always chosen that side of the Question, which upon the whole was not reasonable.

Arlus indeed, the Writer, I mean, of the *Secret History*, who I have reason to think, is abler at asking Questions than he is at answering them, puts in here, and with great seriousness asks, if some *Counter-Steps* have not been made, for fear our repeated Suc-

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cesses should put too quick an end to the War; and that he may not seem to suspect this without Grounds, he desires to know *If last Year's Bloody Battel was so well concerted, as it might have been; and if there was an absolute Necessity to stay Two Days within sight of the Enemy for a few Troops, that never engag'd when they came, and give 'em so much time to throw up such unequal Fortresses before we attack'd them?* I little thought to have seen the Battel of *Taniers* instanc'd for a Counter-Step design'd to hinder the Effect of our former Successes, when it was it self so great a one; but it shews the Absurdity of their Cause, when Victory it self is made a Crime; and they attempt to prove a General designs to prolong the War, because he has endeavour'd to force the Enemy to put an end to it by a new Defeat. This is a strange way of arguing indeed, peculiar to the Cause, and its worthy Defenders. It is a known saying, *Victoriæ ratio non redditur*; but it seems, it now must not be allow'd. A General has been often call'd to give an Account how he came to lose a Battel; but to be accountable for winning one is something new; and if Victories had not been so common, we should hardly have been so difficult; we should have understood the Value of a single Victory, and been thankful for it; but the Number it seems has made us so nice, that we had rather not have them, if they are not just to our Minds; if they are not of as much Consequence as *Blenheim*, or as cheap as *Ramellies* or *Oudenarde*. I would be glad to know, if ever any one *French* Writer treated the Battel of *Landen* with that Contempt that these Gentlemen

tlemen do that of *Taniers*; or thought the fighting it a Crime in the General, because it was dear bought, and had little other Consequence but the gaining what *Arlus* calls *unprofitable Honour*. On the contrary, never Victory was so much magnify'd; the Tongues and Pens of that Nation were for many Years full of nothing else; and yet those who were at that Battel, will tell you, that the *French* did not only lose as many Men as the Confederates, but double or treble their Number; and the Allies recover'd that Defeat so soon, that in Six Weeks time they had a better Army than before the Battle; and all the use the *French* made of their Victory was to take *Charleroy*, tho' the Battle was fought in *June*; a Conquest one may easily suppose they might have made, without the purchase of so dear a Victory; as they made those of *Mons* and *Namur*, Places of much more Importance. Now let us see whether the Victory of *Taniers* be on any Account Inferiour to that of *Landen*. That it exceeded it in Honour *Arlus* himself allows, for he grants, that in all the Wars of immemorial Time, there never was a Battle fought, where mortal Men gain'd such immortal Honour: And whether he will allow it or not, 'tis as certain, 'twas more valuable also in its Consequence, and the Advantage the Common Cause reap'd from it; for *Mons* was evidently a greater Conquest in it self, and of more use to us when *Brabant* had no other Cover than *Charleroy* could be to them; besides *Charleroy* might have been had without *Landen*, but *Mons* could not have been had without *Taniers*; and tho' that Battle was not fought till the last of *August*, *Mons* had

not been the only Fruits of it, if the Weather would have permitted the Allies to keep the Field longer; and the Success of the Siege was a plain Discovery that the Loss of the Enemy was not only as great as that of the Allies, but greater much. Why else should they venture a Battle to prevent the Siege, and yet not move a step to disturb it, when 'twas form'd? Is not this a Confession, that they who thought themselves a Match for our Army before the Battle, did not think so after it, tho' so many Troops were employ'd and weaken'd in the Siege? Did they not spend the time, the Allies were making the Siege, in throwing up Lines, and drawing all the Troops together that possibly they could? And was not the Duke of *Berwick* sent for Post from *Dauphine*, to join with *Mareschal Boufflers* in the Command of them? What, I would fain know, was all this for? Why such strong Lines, so vast an Army, so many Generals, so much Concern, in the middle of *October*, when the Ways were impassable, and the Confederate Army was entirely ruin'd by their Victory? If their Loss was so unequal, as *Arlus* thinks it was, the *French* might have done what they would; they might not only have lain still in great Tranquillity, without any Apprehension of being disturb'd by the Allies, but might have advanc'd to them, given them Battel, and not only sav'd *Mons*, but ruin'd their Army, if they were so much Superior to them, as their Writers would make the World believe. But if we will allow the *French* to be better Judges of these Matters than our Paper-Politicians, the Difference
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that was made by the Battel between the Two Armies, was to their Disadvantage entirely ; and the Impression which the Loss of that Battel gave them, made them think themselves never safe ; as if neither Weather, nor Entrenchments , nor Numbers, could effectually stop the Progress of this Victorious Army, though weakned by 3 Sieges , and a Battel equal to 3 more. They shew'd plainly by all their Motions, they thought nothing impossible to such an Army that could beat 100,000 Men , the best Troops of *France* , through such Entrenchments, or in the Language of the Learned *Arlus* , through such *unequal Fortresses*.

This short Account, I'm perswaded will satisfy you that the Battel of *Taniers* was more glorious in it self than that of *Landen*, more advantageous in its Consequences, more necessary to be fought , and that it turn'd the Scale more in Favour of the Conquerors. Why then must it be treated in so cold a manner ; nay, censur'd and condemn'd ; while the *French* think *Landen* an eternal Honour to that Nation : And that they can never do too much Honour to him who gain'd it ? Why can't they, who love to imitate their dear Friends the *French* in their Government and Politicks, learn a little from them how to value a Victorious General, and the Battels he has won for them ? The *French* have made successful Wars for many Years, and can recount the Names of many great in Arms ; and yet are always ready to do Justice to every new Name, that brings by his Fortune and Conduct fresh Glory to their Nation : But we, God knows, have but one
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to boast of, that has by his Success done much Honour to his Countrey; and him we are weary of. We were once so wonderfully Grateful, that the happy Conduct of one Campaign was thought, or said at least, to be *retrieving* the Honour of our Arms; but now the gaining of a Victory, one would think, were receiving a Disgrace. How must *Boufflers*, and *Tallard*, and *Villeroy*, and *Vendome*, and *Villars*, and the rest of the *French* Generals, who have been unfortunate this War, bless themselves, that they are not *Englishmen*, when they see the Man who has beat them round, treated in this injurious Manner in his own Countrey, after such Services, as the rest of the World never think they can do him too much Honour for? What Usage must this General have expected had he lost the Battels he has won; had he in any single Instance been unfortunate; had but one ill Day succeeded the many Glorious ones he has shin'd in? If so severe an Account be demanded of *Taniers* won, what a Reckoning would there have been, had that Battel turn'd against him? What can be more unjust than to impute to a Design of prolonging the War, a Battel which was fought for no other end, but that the War might not be needlessly prolong'd? A Battel, without which, the rest of that Campaign must have been spent without Action, and perhaps this last also? For we could not have carry'd our Arms into the *Artois*, while *Brabant* was so much expos'd, as it was before the taking of *Mons*; which would consequently have thrust the Work of this Year one Campaign at least backward. But if the Necessity,

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the Glory, and Advantage of this Victory can't keep off these Examiners, you may be well assur'd it will bear Examination: I have heard a good deal of it, and by all I can find, there never was a Battel, for which there was a more unanimous Concurrence of all Parties, than there was here. And the Delay that happen'd, was not only to wait for a few Troops, but for Bread, which Men who had been continually marching for Seven Days together, were not very fit to fight without; besides, the Troops they stay'd for, were not a few, and there was a great Number of Officers with them; and 'tis most ridiculous to fancy Troops were not worth staying for, because they did not engage. At that rate, all *Corps de Reserve* are very foolish and unnecessary Things. Might there not have been an occasion for Troops, because there was not? Or is it no Encouragement to Men that do engage, to know there are others ready to sustain them upon Occasion? But 'tis endless to argue with the real or affected Ignorance of these Men: 'Tis no great Complement to our Generals to suppose they understand their Business; and we ought always to presume they concert their Matters well, unless we are sure of the contrary; which we may easily believe neither these Writers, nor their Masters are, in the Case before us; since they were neither at the Consultations of our Generals themselves, nor pretend to any Correspondence with those that were. And therefore, to insinuate that they did not consider Things so maturely as they should have done, is extreme Impudence. Those *Unequal Fortresses*,
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indeed, which the Enemy had thrown up, were, I have heard, more and greater than they were thought to be: Our Generals knew they were Entrenching; but neither believ'd so much Work could have been done in so little Time, nor that the Fears of the Enemy could make them think so much was necessary. But this serv'd only to render the Victory more Glorious: And notwithstanding all their *Fortresses*, had the Orders, which, to prevent all Mistakes, were given in Writing, been rightly executed, the Price of it had been much cheaper than it was. But there is no need of entring further into the Particulars of this Battel, to shew the Folly and Malice of this most profligate Libeller, and the rest of his Companions. The Event sufficiently proves it was no *Counter-Step* to our other Successes; and the whole Conduct of the Duke, to any Reasonable Man, is a Demonstration, it could not be design'd for one; since had he a mind to prolong the War, he might have done it very much at his Ease, without being at the least Pains for it, or giving the least Suspicion of designing it. For I have already shewn you, he could have done nothing in *Flanders*, unless he had been join'd by a Body of *Imperial* Troops; which you may imagine did not come without sending for; nor could they have been had for sending for, if the Duke had done nothing more towards it. These Troops could not have been got, had not the War been carry'd out of *Italy*; and that could not have been, had not Pr. *Eugene* been supported as he was; had not 8000 *Prussians* been sent to reinforce him one Year, and 10000 *Hessians*,

Hessians, besides a Body of *Palatines*, the next and none of these, 'tis certain, had been sent, but for the Duke of *M.* Nor even after the *Italian* War was at an end, would the Emperor have consented that these Troops should come to *Flanders*, had not the Danger the *Empire* was under from the Neighbourhood of the K. of *Sweden* been remov'd; which, there is Reason to think, the Duke's Journey to *Als Ransstat*, contributed a great deal to.

Thus, you see, the very Possibility of Acting with Vigor in *Flanders*, is owing to the Man who is now accus'd of a Design to prolong the War. But this is not all: When these Troops were in *Flanders*, had they in the Winter been suffer'd to return, they could never have come back again to any purpose; so much Time would have been spent in going backwards and forwards, to and from Quarters at so great a Distance; besides the Burden they would have been to the Country they must march thro'. To make therefore these Troops useful, 'twas not enough to bring them to *Flanders*, but *Ways and Means* must be found to keep them there; which was from the first very hard to do, and every Day grows more and more difficult. Had the Duke now a mind to prolong the War, what a fine Opportunity is here? 'Tis but sending these Troops home, and nothing is so easy as to say, 'Tis impossible to keep them there any longer: For the States of *Brabant* and *Flanders* do already say this; That these Troops are so much in Debt, that they are not able to subsist them in their Winter-Quarters. And this they have persisted in

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to that degree, that nothing but the most pressing Instances of the Duke could prevail with them, to make one Effort more, in a Point of so much Importance to the Common Cause. What now can be more senseless and ridiculous, what more unjust and villanous, than to accuse such a Man of prolonging the War unnecessarily? What have the poor People of *England* done, to be so grossly impos'd upon? Or what Treatment does such a detestable Writer deserve from them, that uses such base and vile Artifices to corrupt their Judgments, and incense them against those who have done their Country the truest, the most faithful, and most important Services? Farewel Gratitude, and Justice and Honesty, and all common Sense, if such Opinions can be entertain'd of a General, who, instead of Prolonging the War, has precipitated it in a manner that will hereafter seem incredible, and by a strange Rapidity of Success and Victory, has outdone our most forward Hopes, and by all his Actions given the World the most convincing Proofs, that he never thinks he can put an end to it too soon.

If any thing in the World be certain, I think this is, That the D. of M—— has not prolong'd the War in the Quality of *General*: Whether what they impute to him in his other Capacity, as *Plenipotentiary*, has any better Grounds for it, shall be the Business of another Letter. In the mean time, I am perswaded, you will not be in haste to hear what I have to say upon that Subject; since nothing can be more improbable, than

than that a Man shou'd endeavour to undo in one Quality, all he has been doing with so much Glory and Success in another.

Such is the wretched Stuff which is impos'd on the Credulity of this poor Nation, by these Infamous Libellers; who take Advantage of the Ferment we are in, to make us believe Contradictions. But what a mean Opinion must these Men have of our *English* Understandings, to think we may be thus us'd? Sure, by Degrees we shall recover our selves, and let them see, we are not the Fools they take us for: Which we might soon do, if we would but reflect a little, and ask our selves a very few Questions; such as these: What can be greater Folly, than to believe in things we don't understand, Men, who, we find, lye so grossly in those we do? What can Men, who, we know, don't want Cunning, mean by imposing on the Nation in such a manner, as if all were Fools besides themselves? Can there be any other Reason for their not keeping within the Bounds of Probability at least, but that they have nothing to say, which has so much as the Appearance of Truth in it? What a sad Cause must it be, that stands in need of such infamous Methods to Support it? What can be a surer Proof of the Abilities and Goodness of the Persons they Defame, than to be forc'd to have Recourse to such vile Artifices? What can induce Men to act so base a Part, but some End they dare not own? And what can that be, but either to give us up directly to *France* and the *Pretender*, or at least to gratify their own Ambition, at the Hazard of their Country? And ought we not to be upon

on our Guard against Men, who by the Means they use, so plainly shew they intend us no good? Can we think our selves safe in Guides, who take so much Pains to Blind those they would lead after them? Shall we not suspect Men have some ill Design upon us, when they try to persuade us out of our Senses; when they tell us, what ruins Credit, will raise Money; that to check the Progress of our Arms, is the way to Peace; and to make an ill War, the only Method to put a good End to it? If we can but once be wise enough, to put these Questions to our selves, we shall soon be cur'd of our Fondness for these false Patriots; who, while they pretend to be our Friends, are doing the Enemy the greatest Service that can be; so much Service, that *France* must be very poor indeed, if they are not very well paid for it: For we may be very sure,

Hoc Ithacus velit, & magno mercentur Atrides,
as we may feel perhaps by the Effects, before we are much older. But Providence has on so many Occasions favour'd us, that I am still, in spite of all these strange Contrivances to ruin us, or rather to make us ruin our selves, willing to hope for better Things.

You will forgive this tedious Letter, and impute the Length of it to the Desire I have, of giving you the fullest Satisfaction in the Points you have been pleas'd to ask my Opinion of, and to the Sincerity with which I am ever,

S I R,

Your most Faithful
Humble Servant.

F I N I S.

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